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The Hand, an Organ of the Mind, edited by Zdravko Radman, consists of seven-
teen essays by an impressive array of philosophers, psychologists, and cogni-
tive scientists, as well as a foreword by Jesse Prinz and a postscript by haptic 
artist Rosalyn Driscoll.62 As the title suggests, this collection concerns the role 
of the hand in cognition and consciousness, and aims to occupy a novel mid-
dle space in the polarized world of philosophy of mind and consciousness 
studies. As Radman points out, there has since Descartes been a methodologi-
cal dualism in studying the mind, with variations of the mind-body binarism 
taking form in the contrasts of “organic versus inorganic, mind versus matter, 
‘I’ (or self) versus ‘it’ (brain), cognitive versus motor, internal versus external, 
subjective versus objective”… the list goes on (Radman: xix). The place and 
function of the hand, however, does not fit well on either side of such a sche-
ma, and it is because of this fact that handedness has been neglected and un-
der-researched in theories of mind and cognition. Indeed, as the authors of 
this collection demonstrate time after time, the hand serves as a unique theo-
retical vehicle that, if not entirely bypassing such traditional dualisms, at least 
complicates them insofar as it often shows itself to play a mediating role in the 
                                                             
62 I would like to thank Georg Theiner for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review. 
 




relationality between intra- and extra-cranial cognition, agency, and minded-
ness. Just some of the most stark claims in this work include: that not only is 
the hand a key ingredient in communicative practice in general (in gesture 
and writing), but that the specific gesture of pointing is integral to the phylo-
genetic and ontogenetic development of symbolic thinking all together (Cap-
puccio and Shepherd); that the hand and its tactile receptivity provide the 
basis for inter-empathetic subjectivity (DePraz); that the hand serves as a facil-
itating device for the cognitive integration of cultural artifacts via the rede-
ployment of less specialized Pleistocene neural functionalities (Menary). This 
volume makes a hard case for the fact that the hand, as an organ through 
which we not only explore our social and objective world but also produce it, 
is integral to the human experience.  
The essays in this text are grounded in several traditions and disciplines, rang-
ing from neurophysiology and developmental psychology to contemporary 
robotics and artificial intelligence, and from the history of philosophy and the 
phenomenology of the classical German and 20th century French varieties to 
cognitive science and the “4E” informed branches of philosophical psycholo-
gy.63 For a reader who wants a state of the art, cross-disciplinary account of 
the hand, then this variety is a virtue. But a researcher with a specific prob-
lem to tackle may not benefit from such a wide theoretical scope. This latter 
point, however, should not be taken as any substantial criticism. If there is 
minor room for complaint here, it is regarding the text’s organization, in that 
the essays sometimes seem unevenly distributed. The book is organized the-
matically, with each section containing works from any number of the afore-
mentioned theoretical holds. However, some sections are longer than others, 
the first and second clocking in at around one-hundred pages each, while the 
third is under fifty and the sixth and final section (containing only a single 
essay and a postscript) is under thirty pages. Moreover, some sections seem to 
be grounded less pluralistically than others, and at times, it seems arbitrary 
why one particular piece shows up in one section rather than another. For 
instance, the first, longest section, “Hand-Centeredness” contains essays based 
more in laboratory work than philosophical reflection and argumentation. 
That’s fine. There is nothing wrong with the content of those works. But to the 
non-specialist, the section is perhaps the most tedious—it certainly front-loads 
the text with a body of work that while quite rigorous and exact, is less reflec-
tive than the rest of the book. There were several essays based squarely in the 
phenomenological tradition that did not warrant their own section, though 
they could have had the editor decided as much. This is not a bad thing, how-
                                                             
63 The “4E” label includes the programs of extended, embedded, enacted, and embodied cognition 
that find themselves united insofar as they eschew the intellectualist paradigm that treats mental-
ity as inherently representational and/or computationally representable. See Menary 2010.  
 




ever. They were placed at appropriate junctures thematically linking them to 
works of a different tradition, providing measured counterbalances. And 
while the essays of section one are all “Hand-Centered,” the same can be said 
of basically every essay in the collection. What does link the particulars of the 
first section is the disciplinary affiliation and background of its authors within 
experimentally based psychology and neuroscience. But I see no prima facie 
reason why certain contents of section one could not have been dispersed 
among other sections. The conclusions of those works were certainly philo-
sophically relevant. As such, they could have been appropriately placed 
alongside more straightforward philosophical reflections, the claims of which 
being either buttressed or challenged by the results of the experimental psy-
chologists. This would have the positive result of highlighting the philosophi-
cal implications of the chapters of section one, implications which as it stands 
are not as ready-to-hand as they could be in a different arrangement. This is 
a  minor quibble, however, as I suspect not many people will read the text 
straight through. Given the interdisciplinary scope of the work, many will pick 
and choose according to their respective interests. But blocking off essays 
from one particular field might tempt a hitherto disinterested reader to con-
tinue along in her or her ignorance.  
As mentioned, this is a lengthy work. There are seventeen essays divided 
among six sections, totaling over four-hundred pages. Unfortunately a full 
review of each essay would require more space than allotted here. But in the 
following I will summarize each work, highlighting its central themes. When 
called for, a more extended discussion will be presented.  
 
1. “Hand-Centeredness” 
While most of the essays in this volume are hand-centered, this section focus-
es specifically on the neuropsychology of hand-centered activity. Jonathon 
Cole’s essay opens the discussion with a survey of relevant case studies of sub-
jects with either partial or total sensory loss. Following the rare cases of those 
afflicted with neuropathy syndrome (where there is an “acute loss of proprio-
ception and in most cases, touch”), Cole describes subjects’ whose loss of pro-
prioception results in cases of limb kinetic ataxia, or the loss of any controlled 
movement, even though the motor nerves themselves function normally (Cole, 
7). Some subjects were able to relearn movement, however, but only with 
painstaking concentration to details that normally go unnoticed by unafflicted 
subjects. Such relearning, however, is only possible by constructing elaborate 
plans through trial and error. At the very least, Cole shows that the intellectu-
alist paradigm of agency as the product of a ratiocinating and “central execu-
tive” planner only seems to obtain in rare and aberrant cases and that nor-
mally mundane actions are the result of an embodied coping mechanisms. 
While the essay at time concerns bodily movement in general, Cole does focus 




on cases of relearning gesture, which seems comes easier than other types of 
bodily movements. Citing David McNeill (2005), Cole concludes that apraxic 
subjects experience less hardship in these cases because the system that con-
trols the hands during gesture action is linked with a “thought-language-hand” 
system that differs from the system controlling instrumental action (Cole: 17).  
Andrew Bremner and Dorothy Cowie focus on the ontogeny of representations 
of the hand, theories of which, they point out, are relatively obscure in devel-
opmental psychology when compared to more mainstream accounts of the 
role of hand action in cognitive development. They begin their essay by out-
lining the unresolved debate concerning whether hands (and environmental 
interaction in general) or inborn intelligence have priority in cognitive devel-
opment. Piaget (1952, 1954) serves as an early representative for the hands-
priority thesis, while the intellectualist position is finds support in Spelke et al. 
(1992) with a “core knowledge” approach that effectively argues that 
knowledge of how to interact with the environment is the result of a phyloge-
netic inheritance. Both theses turn out to be limited, however. Piaget under-
cuts the role of the hands and body, viewing them as ultimately hindering 
abstract perceptions and action schemas, whereas the “core knowledge” ap-
proach never calls into question just how such knowledge is able to be enact-
ed. The authors turn to current research on infant hand representations, tar-
rying between top-down and bottom-up theories of body-schematization and 
internal body modeling. They conclude with a compromise: while infants do 
seem to start out with core knowledge, it is still the case that body schemas 
develop through manual interaction with the environment up until a much 
later age. 
The last two essays in this section are respectively devoted to hand-centered 
space and peripersonal awareness. Nicholas Holmes’ essay “Hand Centered 
Space and the Control of Movement” makes the case for a hand-centered visu-
al representational field. To demonstrate that there are neuronal representa-
tions of hand-centered space, Holmes outlines several experimental situations, 
from the rubber-hand illusion to cross modal extinction and congruency 
tasks. Holmes shows that the hand occupies a unique role in in “determining 
a participant’s ability to detect, discriminate, or pay attention to visual or so-
matosensory stimuli” (Holmes: 60). But Holmes points out that most of such 
experiments only study the hand in passive situations, not taking into account 
the primary function of hand-centered mechanisms—that of action-centered 
attention. Holmes closes his essay arguing that the most basic functions of 
hand-centered representations are the (evolutionarily relevant) actions of 
hand defense movements and desire-directed movements toward target ob-
jects. Continuing with the notion that the hands occupy a primary role in vis-
ual-representational action orientation, Matteo Baccarini and Angelo 
Maravita argue in “Beyond the Boundaries of the Hand: Plasticity of Body-
Space Interactions following Tool Use” that during tool use “we can modify 




our relationship with external space in terms of body/space representation” 
(Baccarini & Maravita: 82). Their main claim is that one’s body schema is al-
tered during intentional and effective tool use, which itself changes the poten-
tialities for action in one’s peripersonal space.  
 
2. “Togetherness in Touch” 
The second consists of literature focused on the intersubjective relevance of 
touch and of more ontologically themed essays on touch and perception and 
reality (the section’s title is apt in this second instance if we think of “toge-
therness” asocially as an “ontological binding”). It commences with Harry 
Farmer and Manos Tsakiris’ “Touching Hands: A Neurocognitive Review of 
Intersubjective Touch.” This essay is an informative take on recent research 
into intersubjective touch, and includes sections surveying findings from evo-
lutionary, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives. The authors move 
from the social relevance of primate grooming patterns to contemporary so-
cio-psychological factors that modulate human intersubjective touch, from 
gender and age to setting and type of touch. They then turn to the importance 
of touch in infancy for the development of social and empathetic intelligence. 
The essay closes with a review of the neural bases of intersubjective touch.  
The two middle pieces of this section are related insofar as they deal with 
more general ontological and perceptual implications of touch. Matthew 
Ratcliffe’s “Touch and the Sense of Reality” turns to classical phenomenology 
to question the hegemony of vision in the philosophy of perception, while 
Filip Mattens’ “Perception and Representation: Mind the Hand” explores the 
subjective reasons that touch succumbs to visual hegemony in the first place. 
Ratcliffe claims that even when touch gets its due credit, it is often only the 
hands that get mentioned, and the more general form of “background touch” 
is overlooked. Such a sense, it is argued, is primary in connecting us with the 
environmental significance constitutive of our “world” (or Weltheit even 
though Ratcliffe doesn’t specifically use this term). Discussions that focus only 
on the exploratory and actionable aspects of touch miss the sense of world-
disclosure that undifferentiated touch, as underlying the perceiver-perceived 
relationship, fundamentally grounds. It is this touch that can best “illuminate 
the sense of commonality (…) that is presupposed by the possibility of encoun-
tering anything as ‘there’” (Ratcliffe: 139).  
Filip Mattens’ piece is an appropriate accompaniment to Ratcliffe’s. Mattens 
discusses the ways in which the hands deceive the intellect into upholding the 
“epistemological credo” that touch is primarily, like eye-sight, an object-sense 
(Mattens: 159). Mattens argues that this tendency obscures the fact that touch 
is primarily not a perceptual sense but a “vigilant sense”—“the tactile sense 
serves an organism not for touching but for sensing that it is being touched” 




(Mattens: 166). The hand however reverses this logic insofar as its exploratory 
movements are often linked with what is seen; touch becomes responsible for 
retrieving objective information about the world. At this point the reader can 
see the usefulness of this collection—already there is opportunity for an en-
counter between Mattens work and Holmes’ work on action-centered atten-
tion. Also, one is curious to see what Ratcliffe would have to say about Mat-
ten’s talk of touch as primarily a mechanical encounter with an object’s 
shape—a direction of theorization that he criticizes as ignoring the intersub-
jective significance of the world as disclosed through touch.  
Moving on, Natalie Depraz’ essay “the Phenomenology of the Hand” picks 
back up on the notion of intersubjectivity and the relevance of touch for inter-
empathetic attunement. Her essay should be appreciated not only for high-
lighting this often under-theorized intersubjective aspect of touch, but also for 
providing the volume’s most thorough philosophical history of hands and 
touch. Classical phenomenology aside, there is sometimes a noticeable paucity 
of historical awareness in this text and it would have been nice to see the au-
thors cite and reflect on their philosophical forebears more often (e.g., the 
editor’s claim in his own essay that “we are both subjects and objects of our 
own doing” seems straight out of Marx, but Marx is never mentioned) (Rad-
man: 386).64 Depraz however is acutely aware of history of reflection on the 
hand. She constructs a narrative of the dialectic between the theses “that hu-
mans are intelligent because they have hands” and “that humans have hands 
(i.e., can use their hands effectively) because they are intelligent.” These posi-
tions seem to first arise with Anaxagoras and Aristotle but Depraz shows they 
respectively resurface in Engels and Bergson (such an opposition indeed mo-
tivates Bremner and Cowie’s article mentioned earlier). What Depraz goes to 
show is that in the history of philosophy the hands are only a matter of inter-
est as they relate to knowledge and mastery—regardless of whether the hands 
are the source of intelligence or vice versa, they maintain the function of facil-
itating knowledge of the world or of practically altering the world to our bene-
fit. The function of the hand as facilitating intersubjective recognition is 
passed over in this respect. Depraz spends the remainder of her essay survey-
ing phenomenological accounts of touch and inter-empathetic awareness in 
the works of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Sartre, Danis Bois, and 
Michel Henry.  
                                                             
64 Compare Marx: “When real, corporeal (leibliche) man (…) establishes his real, objective essential 
powers as alien objects by externalization (Entäußerung als fremde), it is not the establishing (Set-
zen) which is subject; it is the subjectivity of the objective essential powers whose action must there-
fore be an objective one. An objective being acts objectively, and it would not act objectively if objec-
tivity were not part of its essential nature. It creates and establishes only objects because it is estab-
lished by objects, because it is fundamentally nature (weil es von Haus aus Natur ist). In the act of 
establishing it therefore does not descend into ‘pure activity’ to the creation of objects; on the contra-
ry its objective product simply confirms its objective activity, its activity as the activity of an objec-
tive, natural being” (Marx 1992: 389). 




3. “Manual Enaction” 
Most of the latter half of this volume is devoted to essays working within the 
various paradigms of “4E” cognition. Prominent theorist of embodied cogni-
tion Shaun Gallagher starts off this section. His “The Enactive Hand” covers 
three areas of concern for the hand in cognition, all in line with his thesis that 
rationality is proximally and for the most part action-oriented. The first sec-
tion regards the complicated relationship between the hand and vision. Gal-
lagher demonstrates through laboratory evidence (notably the rubber hand 
illusion) that although vision seems to trump the hand in certain settings (we 
are fooled by sight alone into thinking that the rubber hand is ours, evenly 
experiencing experience tactile sensation that is objectively not ours, even 
though it phenomenally seems so), we are not so fooled when motor-systemic 
awareness comes into play. Citing Iverson and Theleon (1999), Gallagher goes 
on to argue that the hand, vision, and neural circuitry take part in a holistic 
operation. Hand movement is neither a bottom-up environmental emergence 
of rational action nor is it a top-down determination of movement. Rather, the 
hand and brain exist in a “single integrated cognitive system” implicative of a 
“reciprocal unity of feedforward-feedback processes in which the hand and 
the brain form a dynamic system that reaches into the world” (Gallagher: 
213). Gallagher goes on in the next sections to describe hands in their practical 
function of worldly engagement, which reads well along Baccarini and 
Maravita’s piece on tool-use and body-space interactions. Gallagher closes by 
reviewing the social and communicative relevance of hand movements.  
“Radically Enactive Cognition in Our Grasp,” Daniel D. Hutto’s contribution to 
the collection, makes a case for rejecting the representationalist understand-
ing of the mind, or the idea that all thinking consists in rational deliberation, 
where thoughts are structured mental representations that have proposition-
ally representable truth values which are computationally manipulatable. 
Hutto does not claim that such ratiocinative thinking does not ever occur—in 
complex future planning it obviously obtains. His point, rather, is that delib-
erative cognition only occupies a small domain of intelligent mental function-
ing and representationalist theories ignore a more primary form of cognitive 
activity in which “the specified body and environmental factors are fully equal 
partners in constituting the embodied, enactive intelligence and cognition of 
(…) artificial and natural agents” (Hutto: 231). Hutto looks to the hand to make 
his case, since it seems that much of successful manual activity does not rely 
on rule following and propositional attitudes but rather on spontaneous alter-
ations that are situationally determined. If intellectualist assumptions were to 
obtain, then it would be the case that manual activity, and indeed all bodily 
movement, would result from the type of calculated planning the Jonathan 
Cole describes in patients with limb kinetic ataxia—which seems to be contra-
dicted by psychological findings. Hutto goes on to provide an intricate discus-
sion of radical and conservative takes on extended cognition, the latter not 




fully jettisoning representations insofar as its supporters maintain that there 
exist mental representations encoded in bodily formats, or “action oriented 
representations.” A crucial issue arises concerning the nature of information-
al content, which presents a stumbling block for this more conservative ap-
proach. After a novel series of argumentations, Hutto concludes that a cogni-
tive system is such that its sensory systems do convey information, but not in 
any sense of passing on meaningful or contentful messages that articulate in-
ner mental representations. Rather, “cognition activity involves complex se-
ries of systematic—but not contentfully mediated—interactions between well-
tuned mechanisms” (Hutto: 248). 
 
4. The Gist of Gestures 
As the title suggests, this section deals with the cognitive role of gestures. Andy 
Clark’s “Gesture as Thought?” makes the case that rather than being used to 
communicate already formed thoughts, gesture primarily plays an active 
causal role in thinking. Clark, keeping with his role as co-originator of the 
“Extended Mind Hypothesis,” (EMH) argues that gesture is part of a coupled 
intra/extra cranial system, and constitutes an organismically extended mode 
of thought. Building on McNeill (2005) and Gallagher (2005), Clark describes 
how gesture may function in a self-stimulated feedback loop, where our 
“prenoetic” actions serve to materialize an ongoing cognitive process, a pro-
cess which finds itself reinforced by the awareness of such actions. As such, 
gesture not only helps bring about an act of thought, but can also serve in the 
transition of one cognitive state to another.  
In “Is Cognition Embedded or Extended,” Michael Wheeler uses gesture to 
argue for his thesis of embedded cognition, a less radical approach than the 
EMH. Where extended cognition takes external environmental materials to be 
(possibly) legitimate realizations of the mind, embedded cognition holds that 
cognition is realized solely in the brain but can causally depend on the non-
neural body and external devices. In dialogue with Clark’s previous essay and 
Gallagher (2005), Wheeler argues that although gestures meet the criteria for 
cognitive self-stimulation, this does not cement the fact that such gestures are 
also the material realizers that instantiate cognitive states. Hearkening to 
a constant criticism of the EMH (Adams and Aizawa: 2008), Wheeler argues 
that though gestures may have a causal impact on cognition, they themselves 
do not constitute such cognition. Wheeler’s essay is long and intricately ar-
gued, but a rewarding read for anyone unsure where she stands on the em-
bedded versus extended debate. It is a remarkable fact keeping with this col-
lection that the crux of Wheeler’s position comes down to the hands.  
 




The final essay in this section changes things up a bit, and we move from ex-
tended and embedded cognition to joint attention and symbolization. “Point-
ing Hand: Joint Attention and Embodied Symbols” by Massimiliano Cappuccio 
and Stephan Shepherd is a fascinating work with deep significance for anyone 
interested in anthropological and evolutionary-linguistic questions concern-
ing hominization and glossogenesis. They frame their essay amidst the debate 
between dispositional and representational theories of social cognition. The 
first implies that for joint attention to obtain, the involved parties must engage 
in “reciprocal coordination mediated by embodied intentions” (Cappuccio & 
Shepherd, 304). The latter account specifies that the respective parties must 
form reciprocal “theories of mind” through which they reciprocally infer rele-
vant propositional states concerning the attentional target. It should come as 
no surprise considering the other essays in this collection that the authors find 
fault with the representational account. They go on to provide a novel account 
of the development of symbolic joint attention, which is or can be representa-
tionally mediated, through a study of pointing gestures. Their basic thesis is 
that declarative (informationally assertive) pointing occupies a central role in 
the move from basic joint attention (BJA) to a symbolically mediated joint at-
tention (SJA). BJA could be simple gaze-following where there is a shared at-
tention to a target, reciprocal attention between both parties, and an iterative 
awareness of the others’ attention. The point is that it does not make use of 
representations. However, while necessitating the same conditions to obtain 
as in BJA, because of the addition of representations SJA has the added bonus 
of producing a rich and varied world of meaning that is not available within 
a paradigm of BJA. Such states of SJA occur commonly enough in the day to 
day world—people awaiting the turning of a stop light for instance. All that is 
necessary is that mutual attention is given to a target (T) whose features are 
intrinsically irrelevant “except instrumentally to make the recipients aware of 
some background information related to shared attitudes toward T” (Cappuc-
cio & Shepherd: 307). In such cases it could very well be that the participants 
formulate theories of mind to infer each other’s intentions regarding T. But 
Cappuccio and Shepherd argue that it is through gestures such as pointing 
that we arrive at the possibility of such advanced symbolization in the first 
place. The core of their argument is that declarative pointing intrinsically pro-
duces a primitive form of representational intelligence, one which phylogenet-
ically and ontogenetically grounds further non-bodily symbolization. They 
claim that pointing “incarnates the possibility of communal attention (…) and 
is simultaneously recognized by all parties as explicitly produced to coordi-
nate awareness” and thus “symbolizes awareness in a prototypical form” 
(ibid.: 305). As such, SJA arises long before we develop the capacity to infer 
peoples’ mental states. The authors convincingly present their case, engaging 
with the work Tomasello, Racine, and Peacocke, among others.  
 




5. Manipulation and the Mundane 
This section begins with Susan A. J. Stuart’s essay “Privileging Exploratory 
Hands: Prehension, Apprehension, Comprehension.” Stuart claims that the 
hands are essential to orienting the subject in space and its establishing the 
ego-centric point of view. Her thesis is that the “failure in functional sym-
metry establishes our physical spatiality and provides us with a situated per-
spective on the world” (Stuart: 331). What this ends up meaning is that the 
hands ground our presence in a manipulatable world: insofar as they are “en-
antiomorphic” organs (qualitatively identical but topologically non-identical) 
imbued with an inherent directionality, the hands by nature reach away from 
ourselves, in potentially different directions. Stuart bases her argument on 
Kant’s proof for the existence of absolute space, though modifies it to highlight 
the point that it is only through prehensive exploration that we achieve any 
com-prehension of space at all. Stuart continues her discussion of the rele-
vance of the hands as the “orienting structures of self-referential anchoring,” 
noting the role of anticipation in corporeal exploration (ibid.: 335). Stuart 
mentions repeatedly the “enkinaesthetic” role of the hands (that they facilitate 
a felt “withness” with other people, agents, and things) but unfortunately does 
not expand on how this obtains. Her account in the end establishes the ego-
centricity of the subject, but only gestures to its inherent intersubjectivity. 
In “The Encultured Hand,” Richard Menary takes a step back from embedded 
and extended theories of cognition to argue that the hands facilitate the inter-
nalization of cognitive artifacts, thereby enculturating the mind. His argument 
proceeds in several steps. He first demonstrates that elsewhere in the animal 
kingdom, intentionality need not exist solely in the head but can be mediated 
by the environment. Using the example of cricket song in mating rituals, 
Menary shows that intentional directedness is structured in a triadic manner: 
a) a male cricket produces song b) a female cricket’s dedicated interneurone 
hears the song and locates the male c) the crickets reproduce. Intentionality 
thus seems not simply to be a property of a mental state but is rather a com-
plex where an organism directs itself by acting, an acting which is mediated 
by its environment and/or other agents. In like manner, Menary argues that 
human intentionality is mediated by our cultural environment. Certain prac-
tices, like writing or arithmetic, have the precise aim of expanding our cogni-
tive capacities. Such practices are culturally bound and thus are normative. 
But it is Menary’s point that once the practices are internalized, the rules are 
no longer referenced. Building off his previous (2007) work on cognitive inte-
gration, Menary proceeds to give an account of how it is that our brains 
can internalize such practices. After all, a cultural practice such as writing, 
he points out, is only 10,000 years old. There is obviously no gene for writing. 
How is it the case that our brains can internalize such a practice so well? His 
answer is that the Pleistocene brain is phenotypically plastic (a version of 
what Bernard Stiegler might call our “Epimethean default of origin”) (Stiegler: 




1998). Such plasticity evolved, Menary claims, as such as an adaptive response 
to environmental contingency. Menary goes on to show that learning-
dependent plasticity “reformats the representational capacities of the brain 
in terms of public representational systems” (Menary: 357). The essay contin-
ues by exploring how such top-down cognitive internalization is coupled 
with more bottom-up cognitive niche construction, and closes by open-
ing the social-political question concerning how our potentialities for ac-
tion in the world fluctuate depending on what processes of integration we 
have undergone.  
The section closes with the Zdravko Radman’s “On the Displacement of Agen-
cy: The Mind Handmade.” The essay pits itself against the idea that agency is 
derived from some sort of centralized cognitive executer. As Radman points 
out, such a conception is the offshoot of a more intellectualist picture of cogni-
tion in general, where an action must be the result of some propositionally 
representable mental activity. This picture is challenged not in favor of a pic-
ture of “blind embodiment and naïve coping” but rather with the alternative 
idea that there exists practical knowledge generated apart from abstract ra-
tionalization that still can effectively cope with the world (Radman: 370). For 
Radman, the hands are the perfect vehicle unto which we can ascribe some-
thing like bodily agency—they can skillfully and actively cope with their envi-
ronment without recourse to central deliberation. The essay begins with 
a discussion of Gibsonian affordances where Radman illustrates that what is 
graspable to a subject depends on what matters to her in her ecological niche. 
It continues with an account of “manual perception” where it is argued that 
much of manual action depends on the interplay between manual guesswork 
and manual intelligence, or the idea that action is largely determined by “cast-
ing a net of the probable onto what will be picked out as our actuality” (Rad-
man: 382). Radman cogently argues that agency is often displaced from the 
“inside our heads” to the points of engagement with the objective world (often 
the hands), and concludes that we should think of ourselves as a “participa-
tory being that engages in worldly affairs (…) without having always to con-
sciously deliberate” (Radman: 389). This conclusion is interesting but one 
wishes that Radman would have gone further. Theorists such as Lambros 
Malafouris (2008, 2013) and Colin Renfrew (2004) have argued that agency, 
and indeed, intentionality, should be thought of as co-operatively emergent 
phenomena not necessarily localizable within any single specific body. 
A thing in the world might have agentive status insofar as I am its possible 
“patient.”65 And as its patient I can realize an intention-in-action that such an 
                                                             
65 The concept of patiency is developed by Alfred Gell (1998) for the purpose of illustrating the 
distributed and relational nature of causality with respect to agency. A patient is the counterpart 
to an active agent, though its passivity does not entail a lack of agentive power. A patient may in 
a different situation be an agent, and vice versa.  




agent calls forth. One could thus view agency and intentionality as situational-
ly emergent events in which things in the world fluidly participate depending 
on the interactive conditions present at a given place and time. Such a view 
surely seems compatible with an outlook that labels the human subject a “par-
ticipatory being.” But Radman’s account only seems to displace agency from 
out of the head and into the hands. We are left to wonder whether he would 
endorse any further displacement. 
 
6. Tomorrows Hands 
In the last chapter in the book, “A Critical Review of Classical Computational 
Approaches to Cognitive Robotics: Case Study for Theories of Cognition?,” 
Ettiene Roesch draws on his experience at the Brain Embodiment Laboratory 
at the University of Reading to elaborate contemporary robotics research. It 
may surprise some to discover (though not when one considers the themes of 
this volume) that attempts to design a robot with functional hands have been 
met with little success throughout the history of humanoid robot production. 
And if the hands are the gateway to the world, it is clear that contemporary 
research is not yet in a position to provide us with any robots with meaningful 
active relations. Roesch closes by maintaining that enactive robots do not yet 
exist. However, if one were to come about, it would have to comport itself not 
as a deliberative and precisely calculating machine, but as skillful and dynam-
ic entity in constant adjustment with its environment.  
To conclude, Radman has done us all a service in editing this volume—the 
first of its kind to my knowledge. As hopefully evidenced here, there is more 
than enough material in this book to fuel numerous discussions down the 
road. And with such a high frequency of conceptual interplay between its var-
ious essays, one should not be surprised to flip open a journal and happen 
upon replies and rebuttals to and from its various authors. It’s easy to see how 
such a volume provides the opportunity for further nuance and specializa-
tion. But it’s also a treat to come in at the ground floor of such an enterprise.  
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